Abstract
Introduction
"Steal the wood from the boiler -cut off your opponent's energy and military strength" -is one of the 36 tricks considered by Chinese military experts from ancient times as key to eff ective warfare. In spite of the passing of time, this principle has not lost anything in topicality and is still as valid today -it is now used to fi ght terrorism. Th e leading terrorist organisation, i.e. the Islamic State, has signifi cant fi nancial resources, estimated at $ 2-4 billion in 2015 (compared to Al Qaeda USD 15-50 million, Hamas USD 70 million, Hezbollah USD 200-500 million) (Wojciechowski 2016, pp. 404-405) . Th ese funds are used not only for organising terrorist attacks which do not require much fi nancial outlay, but also for the operation of the entire criminal machinery -including propaganda, recruitment, training and political activities. As Sebastian Wojciechowski aptly points out, the Islamic State is a new, yet modern form of terrorist activity, beyond the classic understanding of the terrorist organisation which combines, in a hybrid manner, the features of a criminal group, a state, a terrorist network or a military organization (Wojciechowski 2016, p. 402) .
Th e purpose of the Islamic State and the terrorist organisations supporting it is to create the Great Caliphate, not only in the Middle East but also in the European Union (Wojciechowski 2016, p. 399) . Th is is not, therefore, a confl ict of economic interest or territorial ambition -but a civilisational confl ict aimed at an open confrontation between Islamic extremism and European culture based on Christianity. Faced with these threats, it is necessary to take decisive action to weaken terrorist organisations. All the more so because the threat to Europe is growing. Th e Federal Intelligence Service (NDB) believes there is a signifi cant risk that the aggressive struggle for the survival of the caliphate, using all means available, will continue to shift to Europe (Bogdańska 2017) . Although the level of threat of terrorism in Poland is currently low, it cannot be considered that our country is free from any terrorist organisation's activities. Th ere is a likelihood of the transfer of fi nancial resources destined for terrorist activities in other countries through Poland or of raising money here for this criminal act (Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych i Administracji 2016, p. 273) .
Th e most eff ective method of combatting terrorism is to cut off the organisation from the sources of terrorist funding. Th e eff orts of countries involved in the fi ght against terrorism and of international and European organisations point in the same direction. Th is publication will fi rst discuss the key initiatives undertaken at the UN and EU level to weaken the fi nances of terrorist organisations, especially of the Islamic State. Next, threats from these organisations to our country, the modus operandi of the terrorist funders will be identifi ed, as well as the legal framework for counteracting the fi nancing of terrorism in Poland and the principles of organising a system aimed at combatting terrorist fi nancing will be presented. Th e next part of the publication will discuss some of the terrorist fi nancing schemes, both using the offi cial banking system and through specifi c Islamic fi nancial instruments, as well as statistical data showing the results of the fi ght against terrorist fi nancing in Poland.
Th e purpose of the publication is to identify the threats related to the fi nancing of terrorism and to evaluate, in this respect, the condition of the Polish system of terrorism fi nancing prevention and combat. Th erefore, two research problems were formulated: Is Poland suffi ciently prepared to fi ght the fi nancing of terrorism? Given the scale and nature of the current threats, is Poland able to address the phenomenon eff ectively? Th e following hypothesis was formed: It appears that the legal status quo and existing institutional settings in Poland are insuffi cient for eff ective terrorism fi nancing prevention and combat.
In an attempt to verify the above hypothesis, an analysis of international instruments and Polish regulations setting out the framework for the functioning of the system of counteracting the fi nancing of terrorism was performed. In order to determine the number of analytical investigations which may have been related to the fi nancing of terrorism and conducted by GIIF (General Inspector of Financial Information) over subsequent years, a statistical method was employed.
Th e statistical method was also used to establish the number of reports submitted by GIIF with ABW, CBŚ, KGP, KG SG, and UKS Warszawa. Th e analyses demonstrated the extent to which state institutions took actions regarding the counteracting of terrorism fi nancing. Th e method was further applied to determine the performance of courts and public prosecutor offi ces in the area of combatting the fi nancing of terrorism.
Another method used in the research was synthesis, which allowed the researcher to draw general conclusions concerning the study issues and to identify the interrelations between individual elements distinguished in the course of the analysis. (Apanowicz 2005) .
It is justifi ed to investigate this point, a fortiori, as the scientifi c world in Poland has given it relatively little attention, despite the fact that counteracting the fi nancing of terrorism is an important prerequisite for ensuring the security of the state. As Jerzy Wojciech Wójcik puts it, whereas the scientifi c world is interested in counteracting money laundering, there is a complete absence of such considerations regarding the question of counteracting the fi nancing of terrorism (Wójcik 2007, pp. 74-75) .
Contrary to Poland, however, the issue has been widely covered by the world of science in other countries, in particular in the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Israel. Due to the nature of legal regulations, involving a concurrent application of anti-money laundering measures and counter terrorist fi nancing activities, typically both phenomena are studied jointly. Interest in the fi eld surged after the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001. Nonetheless, as indicated by Ehi Eric Esoimeme, these issues had been at the centre of attention of many environments long before the event. By the end of 2000, two international conventions, in which UN Security Council presented mechanisms for identifi cation of terrorist organisations' fi nancial means and indicated how states should freeze them, had been negotiated and presented for conclusion. In addition, soon after the attacks, the Financial Action Task Force issued eight recommendations on combatting money laundering and the fi nancing of terrorism (Esoimeme 2015) .
Source literature also includes overviews of individual terrorist organisations and the ways in which they acquire fi nancial means. Colin P. Clarke conducted an analysis of seven such organisations, including Hezbollah, Hamas, Al-Kaida and ISIS. He reviewed not only the background and origins of the entities, but also the scope of their activities, their targets and sources of fi nancing. According to the author, ISIS -considered the richest terrorist organisation -acquires fi nancial means by robbery, extortion, oil trade and smuggling (Clarke 2015) .
Among other important research are studies involving special Islamic fi nancial instruments, operating outside the offi cial banking system, the so-called hawala. Given that in Poland, there are few studies concerning the subject area, and in view of the growing risk of terrorist attacks in Europe, this practice should be analysed in detail. Attention should be paid, amongst other things, to a study developed for the U.S. Department of State which looks at the hawala system, its history, and the mechanisms of its application in money laundering (Jost and Sandhu 2000) .
Moreover, the "Monthly Summery of Events" monthly reports issued by the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), one of the leading global expert centres, provide interesting data regarding counteracting terrorism, and also in the fi eld related to process fi nancing. ICT is an independent think-tank specialising in the area of security, risk analysis, intelligence materials and defence policy. Th e above mentioned reports are published periodically on ICT's website http://www.ict.org.il (Landau 2016 (Landau -2017 . Th e directive introduces key defi nitions for the systems of countering the fi nancing of terrorism in the Member States, including the benefi cial owner, the shell bank, and the fi nancial institution. In addition, it imposes a number of obligations on the Member States, including the eff ective identifi cation of the benefi cial owner, i.e. a natural person who has the right to make decisions on behalf of a legal person who is a client of a fi nancial institution. Until now, identifying such a person was often impossible due to the lack of information about the natural persons carrying out the transaction on behalf of a given entity. Th e data obtained by the fi nancial institutions as a result of such identifi cation would be kept by the Member States in the relevant registers, so that they could also be accessed by other entities.
International Initiatives
Another important change introduced by the Directive is the obligation to carry out risk analysis at the level of the European Commission and the individual Member States. At present, such analyses are prepared by fi nancial institutions, called obliged entities. Th e development of risk analyses at national level should facilitate the development of professional expertise at the level of the institutions indicated above (Leńczuk 2016) .
The scale of the terrorist threat in Poland
As mentioned in the introduction to this publication, terrorist threats do not bypass Poland. Although the terror threat level in Poland is considered low, no one can be certain that this situation will not change in the coming years. According to the "Report on the security situation in Poland in 2016", terrorist organisations may treat our country as a place where their logistical backbone can be created and through which their fi nancial resources destined for organising terrorist attacks in Europe can be transferred. Th e scale of the potential risks can be demonstrated by the data gathered by investigative journalists from the TVN channel and Newsweek who have determined that USD 9 million of Russian money was transferred through the Polish banking system in the last few years (2012-2014) (Cieśla and Gęsina-Torres 2017, pp. 34-37) . Th e abusive mechanism was called by the journalists the "laundromat operation" from the English word "laundering" (and "money laundering").As they established, the Intradecom Company was involved in this practice. Th is company received, within a few months in 2013, seven transfers from British companies to its bank accounts at Raiff eisen Bank: Tottenham Management Ltd and Seabon Ltd. Th ese companies were involved in a giant money laundering operation that covered 5,140 companies and 732 banks in 96 countries. Over two years, about 21 billion dollars were laundered. Th e case was analysed by 61 journalists from 32 countries.
Th e fact that illegal immigrants using fake documents -visas and passports -resided in our country might be considered a worrying signal. In 2014, the Border Guard Service identifi ed 1,870 such cases. Among the seven people arrested at the time, there was a Polish-Syrian couple who dealt with organising the transfer of illegal immigrants to European countries. In addition, a group of Pakistani nationals appeared in Poland who applied to the Offi ce for Foreigners for temporary residence permits and their identity papers raised doubts as to their authenticity (Izak 2015).
Th ere are also reports from the media about the potential threat posed by organised crime which point to the German Deutsche Bank, operating on the Polish market, which was laundering Russian money. It is estimated that the bank has laundered more than 10 billion dollars in fi ctitious transactions. For legalising these operations, the bank will have to pay a fi ne of USD 630 million (Filipczyk 2017) .It turned out that for 4 years, the bank carried out so-called mirror transactions in London and New York allowing Russian customers to transfer money from Russia via Deutsche Bank. Th is was done without the knowledge and consent of the supervisory authorities in Germany, the United States and the United Kingdom.
"Poland may be an important element in the process of legalising funds derived from ISIS's criminal activity", admitted Andrzej Dobrzyniecki-Cartier, a lawyer of the Polish-Arab Chamber of Commerce in Warsaw (Dobrzyniecki-Cartier 2015). As he stressed, this is possible fi rst of all due to the relative ease of opening a bank account in Poland. In addition, according to the "Report on the security situation in Poland in 2016", the National Security Agency (Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego) conducted twelve investigations in connection with the suspicion of terrorist activity in 2016, and also identifi ed 10 people suspected of having committed terrorist off ences (Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych i Administracji 2016, p.274). Th e number of investigations carried out in this area by the National Security Agency (Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego) was on a similar level in recent years (2010 -4 investigations, 2011 -5, 2012 -3, 2013 -7, 2014 -5) , but in 2015-2016, there were 8 investigations, and the same in 2016 -17. Th e number of suspects increased -in 2015 it was 6 people, in 2016 -10. In contrast, the charges were brought against 6 people -in 2015, and against 4 -in 2016.
The modus operandi of terrorist funders
Successful cutting off of funding sources for terrorist organisations is a diffi cult and complicated operation requiring consistent transnational cooperation. Diverse forms of fi nancing, as well as their transfer, make it diffi cult to counteract them eff ectively. Due to ever-changing social and economic systems, terrorist fi nancing schemes change dynamically so that only some of the most frequently occurring mechanisms can be identifi ed.
Jerzy Wojciech Wójcik attempted to describe the modus operandi of terrorist funders (Hanausek 1978, p. 221 Money for terrorist activities can come from both legal sources and criminal activity. Th e fi rst category includes: sale of crude oil and natural gas, operation of phosphate mines, industrial plants, cereal crops, rental of real estate, stock exchange transactions, sponsorship and donations (Wójcik 2007, pp. 90-96 ).
An important source of terrorist fi nancing is the activity of organised criminal groups that raise money in a criminal manner, and then "launder" it using sophisticated money laundering methods, i.e. the introduction of money from illegal or unreported sources into the offi cial fi nancial circuit. Among the activities that bring the most income to criminal organisations are: drug traffi cking, murders, kidnapping for the ransom, smuggling of arms, cigarettes, control of prostitution, and credit frauds (Wójcik 2007, pp. 82-83) . Terrorist organisations use a variety of methods to transfer funds obtained through legal and criminal activity. One of them is the functioning of secret banking systems which operate outside of the offi cial fi nancial circuit and are not subject to taxation. Th ey rely on mutual trust -the capital is entrusted to one person in his own state and recovered from another person outside its borders. Th e system initially operated on the basis of family relationships, but due to a number of legal restrictions introduced under offi cial banking systems, it also extended to persons within the same terrorist organisation. Th is has intensifi ed the development of the so-called hawala system (Owczarski 2015 Th e transfer of funds destined for terrorist fi nancing is also channelled through online banking products, especially those off ered by e-banks. Due to the intensive development of new technologies, tracking all transactions made via the Internet becomes very diffi cult. Many legal acts in this area are adopted with signifi cant delay, and only in response to these irregularities.
Th e functioning of off shore companies in the so-called tax, banking and trade havens remains undoubtedly a serious problem. Th ese are countries or territories whose systems of law allow business activity with very low or even zero taxation (Bahrain, Vanuatu, and the Cayman Islands).At the same time, these countries guarantee almost anonymity of their operations, mainly thanks to the farreaching banking secrecy. Th ere are also very liberal rules for creating banks in these countries. Th anks to such conditions, it becomes possible not only to secure (from the point of view of criminals) the placement of illegally acquired money, but also its eff ective disguising (multiple transfers about which, due to banking secrecy, no one will ever know).Money from tax havens then goes to countries where they are legalised, for example by buying real estate. Proving the criminal origins of money is extremely diffi cult, sometimes impossible, because the law enforcement agencies of the country, in the absence of any cooperation with institutions located in the tax havens, are not able to prove that the money spent, e.g. on the construction of an offi ce building, had not been earned legally (Żyła 2010).
According to Jerzy Wojciech Wójcik, the possibility of establishing off shore companies in tax havens is a scandal in itself. But their existence is still tolerated. Perhaps because it suits too many interested parties, and perhaps also the economic and political decision-makers (Wójcik 2007, p. 110).

Polish system preventing terrorist fi nancing
In Poland, the anti-terrorist fi nancing system is linked to counteracting money laundering, i.e. the introduction of money from illegal or unreported sources into the offi cial fi nancial circuit. It operates on the basis of the Act of 16 November 2000 on counteracting money laundering and terrorism fi nancing (Ustawa z dnia 16 listopada 2000 r. o przeciwdziałaniu praniu pieniędzy oraz fi nansowaniu terroryzmu, DzU z 2017 r., poz. 1049). Th is legislative act defi nes the responsibilities of the General Inspector of Financial Information as well as obliged entities and co-operating units.
According to Article 3 of the aforementioned Act, the government administration authority competent for anti-money laundering and terrorist fi nancing is the minister responsible for public fi nance, as the chief fi nancial information authority and head of the National Tax Administration, as the Th e General Inspector of Financial Information's aim is to obtain, collect, process and analyse information, and to take action to counter terrorist fi nancing, including:-examining the course of transactions which raised the serious suspicion of the General Inspector of Financial Information: -stopping the transaction or blocking the account; -transferring documents justifying the suspicion of committing a crime to competent authorities; -training personnel of obliged entities in terms of tasks assigned to these entities (Ustawa z dnia 16 listopada 2000 r. o przeciwdziałaniu praniu pieniędzy oraz fi nansowaniu terroryzmu, DzU z 2017 r., poz. 1049, art. 4).
Obliged entities (such as branches of credit institutions, banks, investment fi rms, savings and credit cooperatives, bureaux de change, auction houses, foundations, and associations) are obliged to register transactions worth more than EUR 15,000 and all those transactions which are carried out by a number of operations of lesser value which may indicate an action intended to avoid registration (Ustawa z dnia 16 listopada 2000 r. o przeciwdziałaniu praniu pieniędzy oraz fi nansowaniu terroryzmu, DzU z 2017 r., poz. 1049, art.8). In addition, obliged entities conduct an ongoing analysis of the transactions carried out and take action whenever a transaction raises doubts as to whether it is linked to money laundering or terrorist fi nancing. Th e results of these analyses are stored for 5 years (Ustawa z dnia 16 listopada 2000 r. o przeciwdziałaniu praniu pieniędzy oraz fi nansowaniu terroryzmu, DzU z 2017 r., poz. 1049, art. 8a).
In addition, obliged entities apply fi nancial security measures to their clients whose scope is based on the assessment of money laundering and terrorist fi nancing risks. Financial security measures include, among other things: -customer identifi cation and verifi cation of identity on the basis of documents or information publicly available; -taking steps aimed at establishing the benefi cial owner; -obtaining information about the purpose and the nature of the client's business relationship.
Obliged entities must also implement an internal anti-money laundering and terrorist fi nancing procedure. Th ese institutions are also obliged to provide the General Inspector of Financial Information with information on registered transactions. Th ey must also immediately disclose any transaction information at the General Inspector of Financial Information's request (Ustawa z dnia 16 listopada 2000 r. o przeciwdziałaniu praniu pieniędzy oraz fi nansowaniu terroryzmu, DzU z 2017 r., poz. 1049, art.11).
Th e Act also provides for close cooperation with the General Inspector of Financial Information, National Security Agency, Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, the prosecutor and the units reporting to the Minister of Internal Aff airs and Administration. Th ese entities inform the General Inspector of Financial Information about all cases of obtaining information indicating suspicion of committing the off ences referred to in Article 165a of the Penal Code (fi nancing terrorism) or Article 299 of the Criminal Code (money laundering), or described in the aforementioned provisions, as well as the initiation and termination of the proceedings related to these off ences (Ustawa z dnia 16 listopada 2000 r. o przeciwdziałaniu praniu pieniędzy oraz fi nansowaniu terroryzmu, DzU z 2017 r., poz. 1049, art.14). Moreover, the institutions subordinated to the Head of the National Tax Administration shall promptly inform the General Inspector of Financial Information of any circumstances that may indicate the possibility of committing such off ences.
It should be added that the Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Act was amended in early 2017 in connection with the reform of the tax services which resulted in the creation of the National Tax Administration. Th e amendment entered into force on 1 March 2017. It did not fundamentally change the way the anti-terrorist fi nancing system operates as it had been built on the basis of FATF recommendations and EU law. Th e main purpose of the amendment to the Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Act was mainly to adjust the provisions governing the exchange of information between the General Inspector of Financial Information and the co-operating units in connection with the creation of the National Tax Administration.
However, this is not the only amendment that will cover the anti-money laundering and terrorist fi nancing law. During the preparation of this publication, the Council of Ministers accepted the new draft of the Act in relation to the need to implement the Directive ( Th is new draft of the Act includes, among other things: -granting the status of the obliged entity to entities conducting business activity by tracking services in the area of exchange between virtual currencies and means of payment, exchange between individual virtual currencies, storing identifi cation data, providing customers with access to virtual currency units and using them in accordance with the rules provided for that type of virtual currency; -introduction of the defi nition of virtual currencies; -defi ning the functioning of the Financial Security Committee as an advisory and decision-making body operating under the General Inspector of Financial Information. Th e tasks of the Committee will include initiating and undertaking cooperation steps between public administration authorities in the fi eld of countering money laundering and terrorist fi nancing; -setting out the basic principles for preparing a national assessment of the money laundering and terrorist fi nancing risk -it will be prepared by the General Inspector of Financial Information, and its aim will be to improve the anti-money laundering and terrorist fi nancing system; -the rules governing the use of fi nancial security measures by the obliged entities, adequate to the identifi ed risk of money laundering or terrorist fi nancing; -the obligations of the obliged entities related to the identifi cation of the benefi cial owner have been defi ned -the entities will be obliged to identify the benefi cial owner and not only to make eff orts in this respect (Departament Prawny Ministerstwa Finansów 2017) .
The effects of counteracting and combatting terrorist fi nancing in Poland
At the outset, it should be noted that the defi nition of terrorist fi nancing off ences and the penalty for committing them are contained in Article 165a of the Penal Code which reads: "the collection, transfer or off ering of means of payment, fi nancial instruments, securities, foreign exchange values, property rights or other movable or immovable property intended to fi nance a terrorist off ence or to make them available to organised groups or associations committing such off ence or to a person taking part in such a group or relationship shall be subject to the penalty of deprivation of liberty for a term between 2 to 10 years" (Ustawa z dnia 6 czerwca 2000 r. -Kodeks Karny, DzU z 2016 r., poz. 1137). In addition, relevant information is provided by the Supreme Audit Offi ce report from the audit carried out in 2015. Th e audit covered the period from 1 January 2013 to 30 June 2015, and was conducted from 16 September to 31 December 2015. Th e purpose of the audit was to assess the functioning of the General Inspector of Financial Information in the fi eld of the implementation of the statutory duties as regards counteracting money laundering and terrorist fi nancing.
Th e Supreme Audit Offi ce stated that: -the eff ectiveness of the control system over entities obliged to record transactions above EUR 15,000 was low -among other things when it comes to the money laundering estimated at PLN 18.2 billion in 2014. Assets in the amount of PLN 1.2 million were secured in criminal proceedings, and property confi scated worth PLN 11.5 million, i.e. 0.07 percent of the estimated amount; -obliged entities conducted few controls -17 inspections took place in 2013, 14 in the fi rst half of 2015 and 6 in the fi rst half of 2015. Th e Supreme Audit Offi ce made a reservation as to the selection of control institutions -at the planning stage, risk and control needs were not analysed; -governors, presidents and mayors did not eff ectively control the anti-money laundering and terrorist fi nancing associations.
Th is was mainly due to the lack of regulation enabling them to eff ectively supervise associations (Najwyższa Izba Kontroli 2016). Th e relatively low results in the fi ght against terrorist fi nancing in Poland may raise doubts as to whether our country was indeed a "green island" free from such threats in the period indicated, or whether the system of combating terrorism was not suffi ciently potent. As Jerzy Wojciech Wójcik points out, a large number of obliged entities are not prepared to carry out the statutory tasks, mainly because of an inadequate level of education (Wójcik 2007, p. 343 ).
Jerzy Wojciech Wójcik based the above opinion on the results of the survey conducted among the employees of the obliged entities. Th e goal of the survey was to assess the level of knowledge about money laundering, social, economic and criminal eff ects of this practice, current legal regulations and procedural solutions on how to counteract this phenomenon among the employees of obliged entities. Based on the results of the survey, the author formulated, among other things, the following conclusions: -the lowest level of knowledge has been demonstrated by all respondents in their responses to questions concerning the new legal status; -all respondents have a higher level of knowledge about the legal issues rather than the procedural ones; -bank employees do not have a higher level of legal knowledge than employees of other institutions. Th e level of knowledge about the regulations in force during the survey was generally low (Wójcik 2007, pp. 344-345) .
Conclusions
Th e eff ective combatting of the fi nancing of terrorism is a diffi cult task, especially because of the need for permanent transnational cooperation which is not always exemplary due to the divergent international interests of individual states. And every weak link allows terrorist organisations to prepare for attacks and to collect and transfer money for these criminal acts.
Despite the low threat posed by terrorist organisations in Poland, one should not imagine that our country is free of such dangers. Th is is evidenced both by the fi ndings of the General Inspector of Financial Information indicated in the reports quoted in this publication, but also by the reports of journalists and researchers who have tackled the topic of countering the fi nancing of terrorism. According to this data, so-called "dirty money" has been transferred through Poland and the Polish branches of foreign banks and could be used by terrorist organisations for this purpose. Th e far-reaching anonymity of bank customers and the desire of their employees to continually attract clients, combined with their relatively weak knowledge and low awareness of the risks, make the fi nancial system in Poland attractive to terrorist organisations and they will want to carry out illegal transactions here.
In an attempt to answer the questions posed in the introduction, we ought to express our doubts regarding the effi ciency of the Polish system of counteracting and combatting the fi nancing of terrorism in view of the present threats. A relatively low rate of public prosecutors' investigations and, more importantly, court proceedings, give rise to a presumption that either the level of risk in Poland remains low or the Polish system is unable to eff ectively combat the phenomenon. Given the number of reports communicated by the General Inspector of Financial Information (GIIF) to the Internal Security Agency (ABW) and the list of analytical procedures conducted thereby, we should reckon that threats involving attempts to fi nance terrorism by such entities are identifi ed, meaning they actually take place. To identify the reasons why said actions are not translated into eff ects in the form of prosecutors' investigations and court sentences would require additional research; to conduct such research is now a challenge facing the world of science.
Furthermore, we must note that any attempt to address the question whether the Polish system of counteracting and combatting the fi nancing of terrorism is suitably prepared to face the present-day dangers should include prospective changes in law, such as the new act on counteracting money laundering and the fi nancing of terrorism. Needless to say, such regulations will seal the system, e.g. by defi ning responsibilities of institutions obliged to identify real benefi ciaries or by implementing provisions regarding virtual currencies. Th e obligation to make risk assessments, which will allow one to take up adequate fi nancial security measures, will beyond any doubt constitute another improvement. Hence, we may assume that changes in law in a few-year perspective will enhance the described system's performance.
Th e improvement of the system would probably have a positive impact on greater interest in this area from the scientifi c world. Developing common solutions, based on the experiences of other states and the recommendations of institutions set up to counter the fi nancing of terrorism, would probably have a positive impact on the condition of the Polish system.
